Introduction
In Al Nashiri v Poland and Abu Zubaydah v Poland the Strasbourg Court built upon its momentous decision in El-Masri v FYR Macedonia, which held that Macedonia was responsible for serious human rights violations committed by US officials within its jurisdiction in contravention of the principles enshrined in the European Convention on * Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Queen Mary, University of London: s.r.allen@qmul.ac.uk.
Human Rights. 1 In El-Masri, the Court ruled that the Macedonian authorities were complicit in the Applicant's ill-treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, in two ways. First, by failing to prevent acts of torture, committed in their presence they had connived or acquiesced in such wrongdoing. Secondly, it held that Macedonian officials knew or ought to have known that by handing El-Masri over to CIA agents there was a serious risk of further ill-treatment. But while, in Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, the Polish authorities also violated the non-refoulement principle, a key difference was that Polish officials did not possess full knowledge of the CIA's wrongdoing at the 'black-site' situated on Polish territory, despite the fact that they had facilitated the transfer of detainees to and from this secret detention centre.
Nevertheless, the Court decided that these officials ought to have known about the full extent of the wrongdoing carried out by US officials within Poland's jurisdiction as a result of credible and detailed reports which had entered the public domain concerning the practices used in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation programme, by the material time. 2 Further, as in El-Masri, the Court decided that by failing to conduct proper investigations into each of the claims the Polish authorities violated the procedural requirements of Article 3 in these cases.
The Polish cases represent a significant advance in the Court's jurisprudence regarding the positive nature of the substantive and procedural aspects of the obligations contained in Article 3. From a substantive perspective, the Court emphasized that Contracting States are responsible for maintaining an environment in which all acts of ill-treatments are prohibited. Consequently, if a Contracting State's officials have access to credible information, which indicates that serious human rights violations are being committed, within its jurisdiction, they ought to take the necessary steps to prevent them from happening. In addition, the authorities are under a positive procedural obligation in such situations -they must investigate credible allegations of such wrongdoing effectively as, in the Court's own words, such official action is necessary for the maintenance of 'public confidence in [their] adherence to the rule of law and [for] preventing any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts '. 3 Against this background, this article explores the scope of third party responsibility for wrongful acts committed by foreign officials within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State in situations where its officials did not necessarily know about the full extent of such wrongdoing. In particular, it will examine the limits of the requirements for a finding of complicity for the purpose of establishing third party responsibility under the European Convention by reference to another situation in which it has been alleged that US officials ill-treated and arbitrarily detained individuals pursuant to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Programme, namely on (or near) the island of Diego Garcia in the remote British Indian Ocean Territory, a Territory over which the UK exercises sovereign authority. Specifically, it has been claimed that Diego Garcia, which hosts a substantial US military base, was used to effect the transfer of 'high-value detainees' ('HVDs') suspected of engaging in terrorism, by means of extraordinary rendition, and as a 'black-site' where such individuals were allegedly ill-treated and arbitrarily detained. 4 The UK government has consistently He was arbitrarily detained and ill-treated by his captors. On 23 January 2003, he was handed over to CIA agents at Skopje Airport whereupon he was tortured and transferred, by means of extraordinary rendition, to a CIA black-site in Afghanistan.
There he was subjected to a further period of arbitrary detention and torture under the auspices of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation programme. On 28 May 2004, he was taken to Albania where he released. El-Masri complained about his ill-treatment by the Macedonia authorities. However, after launching an investigation his claims, the Macedonian government concluded that they were baseless. He then commenced proceedings against Macedonia at the European Court of Human Rights for its role in his alleged abduction, unlawful detention and ill-treatment. 7 In relation to the alleged breaches of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court observed that where credible claims have been made that serious human rights violations have occurred it is incumbent upon State officials to undertake an effective and independent investigation into such allegations. 8 In particular, the Court said that:
'The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions.
They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to 7 He alleged violations of Articles 3, 5, 8 and 13 ECHR. 8 At [182] . This is also true of the obligations concerning liberty and security contained in Article 5. See El-Masri (n 1) at [224-243]. establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.' 9 The Court concluded that Macedonia's investigation into El-Masri's claims was inadequate. 10 Accordingly, it held that the procedural aspect of Article 3 had been violated. 11 More generally, it observed that:
'an adequate response by the authorities in investigating allegations of serious human-rights violations […] may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory.' 12 The Court held that the ill-treatment El-Masri had suffered while being unlawfully detained by the Macedonian authorities, amounted to ill-treatment in accordance with Article 3. Further, it decided that the Applicant was tortured by CIA agents at Skopje Airport. 13 As such wrongdoing was committed within Macedonia's jurisdiction, and in the presence of Macedonian officials, 14 the Court decided that Macedonia was also 9 At [183] . This position was echoed in Abu Zubaydah (n 1) at [480] and Al Nashiri (n 1) at [486] . 10 El-Masri (n 1) at [189] . 11 ibid, . 12 El-Masri (n 1) [192] . This standpoint was echoed in Al Nashiri (n 1) at [495] and Abu Zubaydah (n 1) at [489] . 13 El-Masri (n 1) at [211] . 14 Article 1 ECHR provides that: 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention'. responsible for these substantive violations of Article 3 because they were conducted with the 'acquiescence or connivance' of its authorities. 15 On the facts, the Court concluded that Macedonia must bear responsibility for the violation of the Applicant's rights under Article 3 for the CIA's wrongdoing at Skopje Airport because: 'its agents actively facilitated the treatment and then failed to take any measures that might have been necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent it from occurring '. 17 Further, in accordance with the non-refoulement principle, 18 extraordinary rendition to the CIA black-site in Afghanistan because, in so doing, they exposed him to the serious and foreseeable risk of further substantive breaches of Article 3. 19 In this regard -in addition to having specific knowledge about the destination of the rendition flight in question -the Court noted that information concerning the practices used by the CIA in its Detention and Interrogation programme had entered the public domain by the material time. 20 As a result, it ruled that the Macedonian officials either knew or ought to have known that the Applicant was being exposed to a serious risk of further ill-treatment that would be contrary to Article 3 and they should have taken steps to avert such a risk. 21 Accordingly, Macedonia was held to be responsible for this substantive violation of the Convention.
The Scope of Complicity: Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah (2014)
Before examining the way in which the Strasbourg Court addressed the notion of complicity in the Polish cases it is useful to set out the orthodox standpoint of general international law on the question of third party responsibility. 29 However, the Court decided that the Polish authorities had known about the general nature and purpose of the CIA's activities at the black-site, at the material time, and they ought to have known what the CIA were doing there as a result of detailed publicly-available reports concerning the practices used by the CIA pursuant to its programme. 30 Moreover, the Court ruled that Poland had enabled the CIA to carry out such wrongdoing: by allowing the CIA to use Polish airspace and airport facilities; by disguising rendition flights; by providing logistical support for the CIA's operations; and by permitting the CIA to use a Polish base as a black-site facility in the first place. 31 Following El-Masri, the Court noted that, the interrelationship between Articles 1 and 3 meant that the Poland was under an obligation to take positive measures to ensure that all individuals within its jurisdiction were not exposed to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 32 It concluded that Poland had taken no 26 The essential facts of these cases are very similar. However, while Al Nashiri was ultimately detained in CIA black-site in Afghanistan Abu Zubaydah was held in Guantanamo Bay: it has been claimed that he was also detained in a facility on or near Diego Garcia. steps to prevent such ill-treatment from occurring and it decided that, as a result of the authorities' acquiescence or connivance in the CIA's programme, Poland must bear responsibility for those Convention violations, which had occurred on its territory. 33 Regarding the procedural positive obligations generated for Contracting States by Article 3, 34 in El-Masri, the Court held that the lack of an effective investigation by State officials, in response to credible claims that serious human rights violations have occurred, may result in a Contracting State being held responsible for the wrongdoing committed by foreign officials within its jurisdiction. In Al Nashiri, and Abu Zubaydah, the Court took a step further by fully endorsing the existence of a right to the truth. 35 In the Court's view, this right was triggered in situations:
'… where allegations of serious human rights violations are involved in the investigation, the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the In the Polish cases, the Court maintained that the existence of reliable, publicly available reports concerning alleged wrongdoing committed by foreign officials within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State activates those positive procedural obligations, contained in the Convention. Accordingly, in such situations, a Contracting State is required to conduct a proper investigation into such claims -even if they have not been made by the victims themselves -because such steps are vital to 'maintaining public confidence' in the rule of law and to 'preventing any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts '. 37 Regarding the substantive obligations imposed by Article 3, the scope of the complicity test adopted by the Court regarding conduct, which violates the Convention, must be determined. 38 In particular, it is necessary to establish the specific levels of knowledge and participation that are required to underpin a finding of third-party responsibility. The Court's jurisprudence regarding complicity shows that a scale of conduct exists for this purpose, which includes cases of active participation, where the officials of a Contracting State were directly engaged in acts of ill-treatment carried out by foreign officials within its jurisdiction. In addition, liability may arise in cases where a Contracting State's officials witnessed wrongful acts being committed by foreign officials without taking steps to prevent them from happening. 39 In both situations, the Contracting State's officials would have facilitated the wrongdoing of foreign officials in a way which suggests that they connived or acquiesced in behaviour that contravenes the terms of the Convention. However, it is suggested that the threshold for third-party responsibility under the Convention extends beyond situations where a Contracting State's officials have actively participated in such wrongdoing. 37 See El-Masri (n 1) at ; Al Nashiri, ibid, at [495]; and Abu Zubaydah, ibid, at [489] , and . 38 El-Masri (n 1), at [206] ; Al Nashiri (n 1) at [517] In these cases, it identified the ways in which their officials facilitated the CIA's wrongdoing in their territories and how they acquired specific knowledge about the illtreatment of detained suspects by CIA agents. 41 In Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, the Court acknowledged it was unlikely that such ill-treatment had been witnessed by Polish officials and that they may not have known exactly what was going on inside the facility. 42 Nevertheless, the lack of direct knowledge about the particular interrogation practices that were being used in the CIA black-site did not mean that time, which indicated that the CIA's practices were manifestly contrary to the principles enshrined in the Convention. 43 In addition, it referred to the abundance of reliable and consistent reports of the CIA's ill-treatment of detained terrorist suspects in secret detention centres in other parts of the world, which had entered the public domain by the material time. 44 This led the Court to conclude that there were good reasons for the Polish authorities to believe that an individual in US custody, pursuant to the CIA's programme, would be exposed to a serious risk of treatment that would contravene Article 3 of the Convention. 45 While, in Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, the Court held that the reliable information in the public domain could be imputed to Polish officials, and thus to the respondent State, 46 these cases do not appear to constitute authority for the proposition that constructive knowledge alone would be sufficient to establish State responsibility, under the Convention, in response to claims that serious human rights violations have been perpetrated within a Contracting State's jurisdiction. Although some form of knowledge is necessary for a Contracting State's responsibility to be engaged in such situations, it is not a sufficient requirement for this purpose. A Contracting State's officials must also have either participated in the wrongdoing or they must have failed to prevent such wrongdoing from happening. 47 In sum: if (a) at a substantive level, a Contracting State's officials knew or ought to have known about wrongdoing undertaken by foreign officials within its jurisdiction and they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it from occurring; and/or (b) if, at a procedural level, those 43 See Al Nashiri, ibid, at [441]; and Abu Zubaydah, ibid, . Also see El-Masri (n 1) at ibid, and Al Nashiri at and Abu Zubaydah at . 47 Regarding the Court's assessment of the Article 3 violation of the non-refoulement principle, see ElMasri, ibid, [218] [219] [220] and Al Nashiri, ibid, at [442, and Abu Zubaydah, ibid, . officials failed to investigate properly credible claims that such wrongdoing has occurred then the responsibility of the Contracting State may be engaged under the terms of the Convention.
The BIOT and the US military facility on Diego Garcia
This section will explore the limits of the European Court's jurisprudence regarding the notion of complicity for the purpose of a finding of third party responsibility under the ECHR by reference to allegations that US officials carried out wrongful acts in the BIOT -an Overseas Territory over which the UK exercises sovereign authority -which were in violation of Article 3. The section will begin with a brief overview of the BIOT's constitutional arrangements before setting out the UK/US treaties which govern the development and operation of the US military facility on Diego Garcia. It will then turn to consider the actual and alleged instances of the use of extraordinary rendition by US authorities in the BIOT and the claims that a CIA black-site existed on, or near, Diego Garcia. Throughout, it will examine the various institutional responses that have been made to these two related sets of allegations. In this context, the section will assess the way that the BIOT has been governed by UK officials during the relevant period with a view to providing the background by which the UK's responsibility for the alleged US wrongdoing may be determined.
The British Indian Ocean Territory: An Overview
The BIOT was created by the 1965 BIOT Order in Council, 48 which excised the Chagos Islands from the colony of Mauritius (and the atolls of Aldabra, Desroches and 48 The BIOT Order in Council 1965 SI 1965 /1920 amended by SI 1968/111; and the BIOT Order 1976 SI 1976/893. Farquhar from the colony of Seychelles). 49 Through a bilateral treaty, concluded in 1966, the UK government allowed the US government to use the island of Diego Garcia for defensive purposes. 50 It was agreed that this treaty was to be effective for an initial period of 50 years and thereafter for a further 20 years, unless either party served notice to terminate the arrangement. The 1966 treaty was supplemented by a 1972 UK/US Agreement, which provided for the construction of a US 'limited naval communications' facility on Diego Garcia. 51 In 1976, a further treaty -the 'Diego Garcia Agreement' -was concluded between the UK and US governments. 52 It enabled the US government to upgrade the existing facility on the island into a fullyfledged US Navy base. This base was used extensively in connection with US naval operations and bombing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan between 1990 and 2006; 53 and it still 'facilitates Allied operations across the Middle East and South Asia' today. 54 In 2013, the UK government announced that the treaty arrangements concerning Diego Garcia were due to undergo a process of review and that bilateral substantive discussions would take place in 2014 with a view to reaching agreement on the treaty commitments concerning the use of Diego Garcia in late 2015. 55 49 The remote Chagos Archipelago is made up of 56 coralline atolls with a total land mass of 60 square kilometres. Diego Garcia alone has a land mass of 44 square kilometres; however, it has a large lagoon which extends to 125 square kilometres which provides a natural harbour. Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar were returned to Seychelles on its accession to independence on 29 June 1967. 50 
Diego Garcia and Extraordinary Rendition
The practice of transferring individuals between jurisdictions, by means of extraordinary rendition, 56 is invariably used to avoid the constraints imposed by the non-refoulement principle. Further, it is clear that the practice of effecting transfers by means of extraordinary rendition invariably involves the ill-treatment and arbitrary detention of individuals in ways that manifestly contravene the terms of the European has not used the island in connection with any programme involving the use of extraordinary rendition. 77 Despite being informed of the existence of this annual ritual, the Committee reiterated its view that the admission that Diego Garcia has been used in connection with the CIA's practice of transferring terrorist suspects by means of extraordinary rendition, in 2002, had 'dented public confidence in the UK's ability to exercise control over its sovereign territory' with the effect that the 'credibility of US '…Any extraordinary use of the US base or facilities, such as combat operations or any other politically sensitive activity, requires prior approval from Her Majesty's Government and would attract a greater level of involvement by UK personnel both on Diego Garcia and in the UK.' 83 In 2013, the FCO maintained that the combined policies of relying on US diplomatic assurances and of US/UK consultation, in cases where doubt exists as to whether a particular activity falls within the terms of the treaties governing the use of Diego Garcia, was sufficiently robust to ensure that the UK could discharge its responsibilities with regard to the BIOT. 84 However, the Committee did not share this view. After considering the various provisions of the applicable treaties governing the use of Diego Garcia, it reached the conclusion that the UK government has consistently overstated the legal requirements imposed on the US government concerning its activities on Diego Garcia. 85 Consequently, it concluded that any practice of US/UK consultation remains entirely informal in nature and that such a state of affairs was highly unsatisfactory, from a governance perspective. . 85 It noted that 'they do not impose a clear requirement upon the US to seek permission for highly sensitive activity such as rendition, or even to support combat operations', ibid, at [16] . Report, the Committee was particularly troubled by allegations that US ships, stationed in Diego Garcia's 'territorial' waters, had been used to supply prison ships located on the high seas. 86 In response, the Foreign Secretary told the Committee that the UK government had no information about such ships being used for the purpose of effecting extraordinary rendition or for the supply of ships beyond the BIOT's 'territorial' waters. 87 Further, he indicated that, under the 1976 Agreement, the US government was only required to inform the UK government about ship movements in the BIOT in 'normal circumstances'. 88 The Committee concluded that this arrangement was 'unsatisfactory' and it advised the UK government to ask the US authorities to supply information relating to all ship movements involving Diego Garcia's territorial waters, since 2002. 89 In order to determine the UK government's treaty commitments in relation to Diego Garcia it is helpful to examine the relevant text of the 1976 UK/US Diego Garcia Agreement. On the issue of bilateral consultation, paragraph 3 of the Agreement provides that: 'Both Governments shall consult periodically on joint objectives, policies and activities in the area. As regards the use of the facility in normal circumstances,
the [US] Commanding Officer and the Officer in Charge of the United Kingdom
Service element shall inform each other of intended movements of ships and aircraft. In other circumstances the use of the facility shall be a matter of the joint decision of the two Governments.' 86 The Guardian (London, 19 October 2007) This provision confirms that the UK government should have been informed about the movement of US ships and/or aircraft involving Diego Garcia in normal circumstances.
However, it also makes it clear that, in exceptional circumstances, the UK government must be jointly involved in any decisions about the use of the facility, including the intended movements of any such ships or aircraft that involve the use of Diego Garcia. Such statements constitute evidence of inadequate administrative practices and a general lack of effective governmental oversight. As discussed above, deep concerns have been expressed about the UK government's failure to monitor those instances where extraordinary rendition flights have been known to involve Diego Garcia. The UK government's failure to investigate these cases properly once they came to light and its ongoing willingness to rely on US diplomatic assurances regarding the uses to which Diego Garcia has been put, despite the fact that they have already proved to be unreliable, are troubling. These concerns are heightened by the FCO's admission that it maintains a very small official presence on Diego Garcia and that, as a result, it has limited capability to monitor the activities of the US authorities there. Moreover, it appears that the UK government has cultivated a particular attitude concerning the extent of its responsibilities to the BIOT at the level of international law. For example, in response to the alleged stockpiling of landmines on US naval vessels in Diego Garcia's lagoon, the UK government has argued that as long as such activities take place on US ships then they have not occurred on territory over which the UK exercises sovereign authority -which would otherwise have been contrary to the UK's obligations under the terms of the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Convention. 91 However, as the lagoon qualifies as part of the BIOT's 'territorial waters' it falls under the UK's sovereign authority, this argument is far from convincing. 92 In sum, it is clear that the UK government is failing to satisfy the responsibilities that it owes in respect of this Overseas Territory.
The Diego Garcia 'Black-site' Allegations
In addition to claims that Diego Garcia was used in connection with the transfer of HVDs, by means of extraordinary rendition, it has been alleged that a secret detention facility existed either on the island, or on US vessels anchored in the BIOT's territorial waters, and that it was used as a black-site by the US authorities pursuant to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation programme. This sub-section will examine these allegations and the way that domestic and international institutions -including the UK government -have responded to such claims.
In its 2008 Report on British Overseas Territories, the Foreign Affairs
Committee stated that it had received evidence from the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition and from the NGO Reprieve regarding claims that Diego Garcia had been used in connection with the secret detention of terrorist suspects. 93 Specifically, it was alleged that 'ships in or near its territorial waters had also been 91 See the Ottawa Convention on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997) As noted above, the Committee expressed the view that the lack of historical flight data relating to Diego Garcia meant that it was hard to test the veracity of such allegations. 101 However, the UK government responded to such claims by stating that: 'The US government denies having interrogated any terrorist suspect or terrorism-related detainee on Diego Garcia since 11 September 2001. They have also informed us that no detainees have been held on ships within Diego Garcia's territorial waters over that period, and that they do not operate detention facilities for terrorist suspects on board ships.' 102 Despite such denials, it is clear that the Foreign Affairs Committee is still disturbed by the UK government's ongoing reliance on US diplomatic assurances and it remains sceptical about claims that the US authorities have not engaged in wrongdoing in the BIOT, other than in those cases in which it has been admitted. Lord Hoffmann felt able to allude to allegations that 'Diego Garcia or a ship in the waters around it have been used as a prison in which suspects have been tortured '. 105 The Executive Summary of the US Senate Intelligence Committee's Report on the CIA's Programme was published in December 2014. 106 This Summary did not refer to the CIA's use of Diego Garcia. Nonetheless, it is widely believed that the full (classified) report addresses the role that the island played in the CIA's programme. 107 It has been reported that the UK government lobbied members of the US Senate [2008] 3 WLR 955 at [35] . 106 See the Senate Committee's Report (n 2). 107 The Guardian (London, 16 August 2014). 108 The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, explained that: 'We have made representations to seek assurances that ordinary procedures for clearance of UK material will be followed in the event that UK material provide [d] to the Senate committee were to be disclosed', The Guardian (London, 16 August 2014) . 109 The Guardian (London, 30 Jan 2015) 110 HC Deb 10 June 2014, col 91W -quoted at para 11 of the 2014 FAC Report on Diego Garca (n 55). 
The Applicability of Human Rights Treaties to the BIOT
This section will consider the extent to which those human rights treaties most closely associated with the prevention of ill-treatment and arbitrary detention are applicable to the BIOT. It will pay particular attention to arguments concerning the jurisdictional scope of such treaties before exploring the issue of the substantive application of the ECHR to the BIOT.
The Territorial Reach of Human Rights Treaties
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that 'unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory'. 115 Hendry and Dickson argue that the UK government has adopted a general practice of not extending treaty commitments to its Overseas Territories. They claim that it has established a 'different intention' for the purpose of determining the jurisdictional scope of multilateral treaties. Accordingly, they assert that such treaties concluded by the UK do not automatically apply to British Overseas Territories. 116 (1) 'Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. (2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.' On 24 October 2008, the Committee Against Torture adopted General Comment 2, which concerned the jurisdictional scope of the Convention. In the section which addressed the absolute nature of the prohibition on torture, the Committee stated, at paragraph 7, that it: '…understands that the concept of "any territory under its jurisdiction," linked as it is with the principle of non-derogability, includes any territory or facilities and must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen without discrimination subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party…' UN Committee against In that case, the Court found itself in the unusual situation of not having a merits decision by a competent national court upon which to rely for the purpose of reconstructing the material facts. 126 Nevertheless, it took the view that it was capable of evaluating the evidence placed before it and of drawing the appropriate inferences regarding the conduct of the authorities from the available information. 127 Although El Masri confirmed that there is nothing to stop Contracting States from pleading secrecy privileges in litigation before the Strasbourg Court, it showed the Court's willingness to adjust its approach to the available evidence in the face of such special pleading, in terms of the sources of evidence upon which it was prepared to rely; in its assessment of the probative value of any such evidence; and by reversing the burden of proof in such exceptional cases. 128 The Court's preparedness to vary its methodological approach to the evidential considerations to fit the circumstances of a case involving claims of serious human rights violations is significant given the allegations regarding the misuse of Diego Garcia by the US authorities and the UK government's apparent inertia in response to such claims that violations of the Convention have occurred in the BIOT.
A US military detention facility is known to exist on Diego Garcia. 129 Further, as noted above, it has been claimed that terrorist suspects may have been secretly detained and interrogated by US authorities on US naval ships anchored in Diego Garcia's large harbour. 130 Clearly, any activities carried out in the BIOT's territorial waters would be subject to the UK's sovereign authority. As discussed above, the UK government has remained tight-lipped about what it knew about the CIA's use of Diego Garcia in connection with its Detention and Interrogation programme and when it acquired any such information. However, it is unlikely that UK officials witnessed or actively participated in any alleged wrongdoing carried out by US officials in the BIOT, pursuant to the CIA's programme.
A major difference between the cases of El-Masri, Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah and situation concerning the prospective responsibility for the UK under the European Convention for the CIA's reputed activities on, or near, Diego Garcia, is that the former cases involved actions that occurred on the respondent State's national territory and, as a result, the issue of State jurisdiction proved to be unproblematic. In contrast, the latter situation concerns allegations about the existence of a CIA black-site located in 128 See Imakayeva v Russia (2008) Accordingly, given the extent to which the US authorities control Diego Garcia, it is doubtful that they would need an equivalent level of assistance from the UK authorities, in order to enable them to carry out the alleged wrongdoing, as that which was required from the Polish officials in the cases of Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah.
This raises the question of whether a less exacting test should be applied to UK officials regarding their oversight of the activities reputedly conducted by US authorities in the BIOT for the purpose of determining whether the UK's responsibility should be engaged under the European Convention. It is suggested that it would be a mistake to concentrate upon the extent to which a Contracting State's officials facilitated wrongdoing by foreign officials within its jurisdiction: instead it is suggested that the main focus should be on the positive duties of preventing wrongful acts from occurring and investigating credible allegations of such wrongdoing effectively, in such cases.
As discussed in section 2, in El-Masri, Al Nashir and Abu Zubaydah, the officials of the respondent States had direct knowledge of the CIA's wrongdoing within their jurisdiction. However, the extent to which the UK authorities knew about the reputed activities of US authorities in respect of the BIOT has not been substantiated. This More broadly, the above discussion prompts reflection on the question of the extent to which Contracting States are required to take positive measures to satisfy the obligations enshrined in the European Convention. In particular, the extent to which they are responsible for preventing instances of ill-treatment and arbitrary detention from occurring within their jurisdiction and for investigating cases properly where such wrongdoing has been alleged. As the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence makes clear, an effective official response is required in order to maintain public confidence in the rule of law and to prevent 'any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts'. 131 In the circumstances, the notion of complicity for third party responsibility -that the officials of a Contracting State have connived or acquiesced in wrongful acts committed by foreign officials within its jurisdiction -must be determined not just by what those officials actually knew but also by what they ought to have known at the relevant time.
Regarding the allegations that the US authorities committed wrongful acts in the BIOT, acts which, if proven, would violate the terms of the European Convention, it is apparent that the prospect of the UK's responsibility being engaged for such alleged wrongdoing is conceivable, when measured against the requirements for a finding of complicity in accordance with the spirit of the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence in this area. As discussed in section 3, numerous credible and publiclyavailable reports alleging that individuals have been ill-treated and arbitrarily detained, either in a US military detention facility on Diego Garcia or on US ships stationed in the BIOT's territorial waters, have entered the public domain since 2002.
Further, it is apparent that the UK government has failed to govern the BIOT properly. In particular, it has failed to maintain an official presence on Diego Garcia that is adequate to the task of overseeing the activities of US authorities on and around the island. This conclusion is evidenced by the failure of UK officials to detect the two admitted US rendition flights that landed on Diego Garcia in 2002; and the poor keeping of flight and immigration record by those UK officials based on Diego Garcia within the relevant period. It is also supported by the UK government's failure to satisfy its treaty commitments in respect of Diego Garcia. According to the terms of the 1976 131 See El Masri (n 1) at ; Al Nashiri (n 1) at [495] ; and Abu Zubaydah (n 1) at [489] , and . UK/US Diego Garcia Agreement, the UK was supposed to be jointly involved in decisions concerning the use of Diego Garcia by US aircraft and ships in exceptional circumstances. As noted above, in 2008, the Foreign Secretary appeared to be labouring under the misapprehension that the US authorities were only under a duty to inform UK officials of the movement of US ships in the BIOT in normal circumstances; 132 and others in the UK government were under the impression that what happened on US ships in Diego Garcia's territorial waters was of no concern to the UK authorities. 133 However, if the UK government has insisted on the need for joint decisions regarding the exceptional use of Diego Garcia by the US authorities then it would have been in a position to know about the actual and alleged instances of illtreatment and arbitrary detention of individuals by US officials in the BIOT during the period in question.
The UK authorities failed to act on the credible publicly available allegations that individuals were being ill-treated and arbitrary detained by US officials in the BIOT. UK government has not investigated these claims in a meaningful way: instead, it has preferred to rely on diplomatic assurances given by the US government, despite the fact that they have proved to be unreliable in the past. In particular, the UK government should have conducted an effective investigation into concerns raised about how the US authorities used Diego Garcia in connection with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation programme -including a full investigation into the two publicly admitted rendition flights, which landed on Diego Garcia in 2002 -in accordance with the positive obligations enshrined in the European Convention.
Conclusion
This article examined the way that the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence regarding This article harnessed allegations that US officials ill-treated and arbitrarily detained individuals on, or near, Diego Garcia, in the BIOT as a case study through which to assess the parameters of third party responsibility under the terms of the European Convention. It showed that the requisite level of knowledge, on the part of the relevant officials, can be constructed by reference to reliable, publicly-available reports, which draw attention to allegations of serious human rights abuses. If the authorities fail to take the necessary steps to investigate such claims and to prevent such wrongdoing from occurring then it is suggested that the threshold for a finding of third party responsibility should be satisfied. Poor standards of governance facilitate and compound wrongdoing carried out by foreign officials in overseas locations.
Moreover, as the case of Diego Garcia demonstrates, maladministration may, inadvertently, foster a culture of impunity and unaccountability. The risks created by the emergence and maintenance of such human rights 'blind-spots' underscores the significance of the function performed by positive obligations in contemporary human rights jurisprudence.
